Such performance requires perceptual representations that reflect the subtle differences between actions, for example, to support the recognition of emotional state or gender from movement (Dittrich, Troscianko, Lea, & Morgan, 1996 Kozlowski & Cutting, 1977 Pollick, Paterson, Bruderlin, & Sanford, 2001). This implies that representations of form and motion share fundamental properties and places constraints on the computational mechanisms that support the recognition of biological motion patterns.īiological movements can be recognized, both by humans and animals, with minimal effort and high precision, even from point-light stimuli (Blake & Shiffrar, 2007 Johansson, 1973). Our findings suggest that the visual perception of body motion is veridical and closely reflects physical similarities between joint trajectories. delayed match-to-sample) and of the method of stimulus presentation (point-light stimuli vs. These outcomes were independent of the experimental paradigm for the assessment of perceived similarity (pairs-comparison vs. In addition, we found an even higher similarity between the perceptual metrics and the metrics of a physical space that was defined by distance measures between joint trajectories, which compute spatial trajectory differences after time alignment using a robust error norm. These configurations resemble the true stimulus configurations in the space of morphing weights. By multidimensional scaling, we reconstructed from similarity judgments the perceptual space configurations of stimulus sets generated by motion morphing. We show that visual representations of complex body movements are characterized by perceptual spaces with well-defined metric properties. While cortical structures involved in biological motion recognition have been identified, the nature of the underlying perceptual representation remains largely unknown. Constructivist Foundations 13(1): 117–125.Body movements are recognized with speed and precision, even from strongly impoverished stimuli. (2017) Missing colors: The enactivist approach to perception.
Key words: Enaction, perception, misrepresentation, comparability, high color space dimensionality, objectivism, subjectivism, computational science Citation Constructivist content: The presence of singular “visual channels”, as well as physical, sensorimotor and evolutionary factors, constrains our own perceptual experience as proposed by enactivism. We argue that an enactivist theory of visual perception may not only clarify the problematic consequences of those assumptions, but also fruitfully guide future philosophical and empirical research on this topic. Implications: Epistemological problems related to perception are here tackled, considering some controversial assumptions related to vision. Results: As shown, philosophy and computational science have recently incorporated concepts from neurobiology that close gaps between disciplines and support aspects of the enactivist approach of vision.
Method: We carried out a literature survey to draw attention to the status of the enactivist theory of vision and to explore how the problems of misrepresentation and comparability may be tackled. We live with other creatures in sensory worlds that are not tractable, so could we share color-similar experiences? We are still missing an integrative enactive framework to tackle the problems of misrepresentation and comparability related to animal color experience. Problem: Varela held that the problem of misrepresentation and the comparability of visual experience were crucial. Context: Part of Varela’s work focused on the study of visual perception, particularly on the grounds of an enactivist theory of vision.
0 kommentar(er)
